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The axiom of choice, co-comprehension schema
and redundancies in triposes
Fabio Pasquali
Introduction
The notion of tripos has been introduced in [2] and it turned out to be of central
importance in category theory and categorical logic, see [2, 3, 7] and references
therein. Every tripos is an instance of the more general concept of doctrine
and, remaining at an informal level, a doctrine can seen as a pair (C, P ) where
C is a cartesian category endowed with a chosen logic P (all formal definitions
are postponed to section 1). Following this informal description of doctrines,
we can say that, from a purely logical point of view, that a tripos is a doctrine
expressing higher order intuitionistic logic with equality1, i.e. the fragment
P,Π,Σ,→,∧,∨,⊤,⊥,=
where we wrote P to indicate the fact that the logic is higher order, Π do indi-
cate universal quantification and Σ to indicate existential quantification.
The structure of a tripos closely relates the category C with the logic P . To
stress this correspondence we mention an important fact concerning the theory
of triposes, the Tripos To Topos construction [2, 7]. This is a construction which
takes any tripos (C, P ) and produces an elementary topos, usually denote by
C[P ], in such a way that the construction provides a left adjoint functor to the
inclusion of the category of elementary toposes and logical functors is into the
category of triposes and logical functors [6]. Known examples of such toposes
are the effective topos and any topos of sheaves over a locale [7]. Thus, saying
that C is the base of a tripos, i.e that there is a pair (C, P ) which is a tripos, is
to say that C already possesses a sufficient structure to be freely completed to
an elementary topos.
A fact of particular interest for this paper is that there are some redundan-
cies in the notion of tripos. Using Prawitz ’s second order encoding of first
order predicates logic [9], it has been proved that a doctrine expressing the
fragment
P,Π,→
1 It is common to refer at equality in triposes as non-extesional. There are several notions of
extensionality in categorical logic. One of these, which can be phrased using the structure of a
tripos, is that for two terms q and p of type P(A) it is q = p if and only if ∀x:A x ∈ q ↔ x ∈ p.
There are triposes for which this property is valid - it is enough to think at the internal logic
of any elementary topos - but that property fails to hold for generic triposes. In particular it
fails in important triposes such as the realizability tripos and in some localic triposes [3]. In
this respect, the equality in triposes is non-extensional.
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is a tripos [2, 3].
As one might aspect, the operation of implication → is strongly connected
to universal quantification Π. This connection can be outlined if the doctrine
(C, P ) has comprehension. In a doctrine (C, P ) the property of having compre-
hension is the possibility to make correspond formulas of the logic P to arrows
of C, in such a way that, if φ is the formula of P to which corresponds the
arrow ⌊φ⌋, we can think of the domain of ⌊φ⌋ as the abstract collection of those
terms t such that φ(t) holds. Doctrines with comprehension and triposes with
comprehension share many interesting properties which we will not discuss here
and we address interested readers to [1, 3].
A theorem in [4] states that a doctrine expressing the fragment {},Π,∧,⊤,
where we use {} to denote that the doctrine has comprehension, has also the
operation of implication. An obvious corollary is that a doctrine expressing the
fragment
P, {},Π,∧,⊤
is a tripos with comprehension.
In this paper we study the notion of co-comprehension (the dual notion of com-
prehension) and the axiom of choice in the context of doctrines. In particular we
study how these two properties contribute to definability, i.e. in reconstructing
a certain structure from a (apparently) poorer one.
Co-comprehension is the dual notion of comprehension, i.e the possibility to
associate to every formula φ of P a monic ⌈φ⌉ of C in such a way that the do-
main of ⌈φ⌉ abstractly represents the collection of those terms t such that φ(t)
does not hold. Of course in classical logic both the notions of comprehension
and co-comprehension are derivable from the other, but they are independent
if we work in an intuitionistic framework.
We formulate the axiom of choice (AC) in a doctrine (C, P ) by requiring that
every existentially quantified formulas of P has a chosen witness (as in Hilbert’s
epsilon calculus).
We prove that if a cartesian category C is the base of a doctrine (C, P ) ex-
pressing the fragment
AC, {}o,P,∧,⊥,=
(where we denote by {}o the property of having co-comprehension) then C is
also the base of a tripos (C, P ′). In other words C already has the sufficient
structure to freely build a topos. The way in which P ′ is built is instrumental
to prove our second result, i.e. that any doctrine expressing the fragment
AC, {}o,P,→,=
is already a tripos.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we recall definitions and known
facts concerning doctrines and triposes. We recall also the notion of comprehen-
sion and full comprehension. Even if we did not stress the difference between
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comprehension and full comprehension in the previous part of the introduction,
this is very important in the paper (and for the theory of doctrines in gen-
eral). The role of fullness of comprehension in relation with the operation of
implication is discussed in section 2, where we prove that every doctrine with
full comprehension and right adjoints which satisfy (a form of) Beck-Chevalley
condition is implicational. In the same section we introduce also the notion
of co-comprehension and full co-comprehension and we study its link with the
operation of negation. In particular we study the link between fullness of co-
comprehension and classical logic. In section 3 we give the definition of doctrine
validating AC and we develop a piece of theory of these doctrines. In section
4 we study those doctrines that have equality predicates, full co-comprehension
and which satisfy the axiom of choice. We prove that if AC well behaves with
respect to equality and co-comprehension in a higher order doctrine (C, P ), then
we can build on C a tripos (C, P ′). We prove also that, in the case (C, P ) has
the operation of implication, is already a tripos.
1 Preliminaries on doctrines and triposes
In this section we recall several definitions concerning doctrines. We refer the
reader to [3, 8] for a more detailed account.
Doctrines
Denote by Pos the category of partially ordered sets and monotone functions
and byMSL the subcategory of Pos on meet-semilattices and homomorphisms
between them, where a meet-semilattice is a poset with binary meets.
A doctrine is a pair (C, P ) where C is a category with finite products and P
is a functor
P : Cop −→ Pos
(C, P ) is said primary if P factors through MSL.
In lattices of the form P (A) we shall denote binary meets by ∧ and the top
element, if it exists, by ⊤A. The category C is called base of the doctrine. For
every arrow f of the base, we shall write f∗ instead of P (f).
Suppose (C, P ) is a doctrine. Suppose u:X −→ A is an arrow of the base.
Suppose that there are functors
Πu,Σu:P (X) −→ P (A)
such that for every α in P (X) and every β in P (A) it is
α ≤ u∗Σuα and Σuu
∗β ≤ β
u∗Πuα ≤ α and β ≤ Πuu
∗β
Σu is said to be left adjoint to u
∗, while Πu is said to be right adjoint to u
∗.
We denote this by Σu ⊣ u
∗ and u∗ ⊣ Πu.
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A doctrine (C, P ) is elementary if it is primary and for every A in C there
is an element δA in P (A × A) such that for every arrow f :A −→ X in C and
every ψ in P (X ×A) the assignment
ψ 7→ 〈π1, π2〉
∗ψ ∧ 〈π2, π3〉
∗δA
gives rise to a functor
Σ(idX×∆A):P (X ×A) −→ P (X ×A×A)
which is left adjoint to (idX ×∆A)
∗, where πi, with i = 1, 2, 3, are the projec-
tions from X ×A×A to each of the factors and ∆A = 〈idA, idA〉:A −→ A×A
is the diagonal arrow of A.
The element δA in P (A×A) is often called equality predicate overA. Equality
predicates are substitutive, i.e for every A in C and every ψ in P (A)
π∗1ψ ∧ δA = π
∗
2ψ ∧ δA
where π1 and π2 are the first and second projection from A×A.
Let A be a class of arrows of C which is stable under pullbacks, i.e. if f :A −→ B
is in A and p:X −→ B is an arrow in C, the pullback of f along p, if it exists,
is in A. Suppose now that for every arrow f :A −→ B in A the functor f∗
has a left adjoint Σf . We say that left adjoints satisfy the Beck-Chevalley
condition with respect to A if for every pullback
Y
g
//
k

X
h

A
f
// B
with f (and therefore g) in A, it holds that
h∗Σfγ ≃ Σgk
∗γ
for any γ in P (A). We say that left adjoints verify the restricted Beck-
Chevalley condition with respect to A if for any ξ in P (B) it holds
h∗Σff
∗ξ ≃ Σgk
∗f∗ξ
Definitions for right adjoints Π are analogous.
Suppose A is a pullback stable class of morphisms of C. Let (C, P ) be a doctrine.
(C, P ) is a (restricted) Σ(A)-doctrine if for every arrows f in A the func-
tor f∗ has a left adjoint Σf satisfying the (restricted) Beck-Chevalley condition
with respect to A.
Recall that in every category with finite products the class Prj of product
projections, i.e. the class of arrows of the form πA:X −→ A where A appears
as a factor in X , is stable under pullbacks. We shall write Σ-doctrine instead
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of Σ(Prj)-doctrine.
Π(A)-doctrines, restricted Π(A)-doctrines and Π-doctrines are defined analo-
gously.
A primary Σ(A)-doctrine in which for every f :X −→ A in A, for every α
in P (X) and every β in P (A) it is
Σf (α ∧ f
∗β) = β ∧ Σfα
is said to satisfy Frobenius Reciprocity. Σ-doctrines which satisfy Frobenius
Reciprocity are called existential.
Every existential elementary doctrine (C, P ) has the property that for every
arrow f :A −→ B in C the functor f∗ has a left adjoint which is computed by
the following assignment
Σfα = ΣpiB [(f × idB)
∗δB ∧ π
∗
Aα]
where πB and πA are projections from A×B to each of the factors [3, 7].
Comprehension
A doctrine (C, P ) is said to have comprehension if for every A in C the poset
P (A) has a top element ⊤A and for every α in P (A) there is a morphism
⌊α⌋: {α} −→ A
with ⌊α⌋∗α = ⊤{α} such that for every arrow f :Y −→ A with f
∗α = ⊤Y there
is a unique arrow k:Y −→ {α} with ⌊α⌋k = f .
It is an easy check to verify that arrows of the form ⌊α⌋ are monic. For ev-
ery A in C we denote by subC(A) the poset of subobjects of A. The assignment
α 7→ ⌊α⌋ is a faithful functor from the poset P (A) to the poset subC(A)
2. If it
is also full we say that the doctrine (C, P ) has full comprehension.
A useful property of full comprehension is that for every α, β in P (A) it holds
that α ≤ β if and only if ⊤{α} = ⌊α⌋
∗β.
Suppose (C, P ) has comprehension. Denote by CP the class of arrows of C
of the form ⌊α⌋. Then CP is stable under pullbacks, in fact for every A in C,
every α in P (A) and every f :X −→ A the following square
{f∗α}
⌊f∗α⌋

q
// {α}
⌊α⌋

X
f
// A
where q is the arrow induced by the universal property of ⌊α⌋, is a pullback.
2As customary, we freely confuse a subobject with any of its representative.
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Weak power objects
Suppose (C, P ) is a doctrine. We say that (C, P ) has weak power objects if
for every A in C there is an object P(A) in C and an element ∈A in P (A×P(A))
such that for every Y in C and every φ in P (A× Y ) there is an arrow
χφ:Y −→ P(A)
with (idA × χφ)
∗ ∈A= φ.
The term weak comes from the fact that arrows of the form χφ need not to
be unique. A doctrine is said higher order if it has weak power objects.
Triposes
Triposes are the appropriate doctrines to express higher order predicates logic
[3]. The following definition of tripos is deduced from [7].
Denote by Hyt the category of Heyting algebras and homomorphisms between
them. A doctrine (C, P ) is said propositional if P factors through Hyt.
(C, P ) is a tripos if
i) (C, P ) is propositional
ii) (C, P ) is a Σ-doctrine and a Π-doctrine
iii) for each diagonal ∆X :X −→ X ×X there is δX in P (X ×X) such that
for every α in P (X ×X)
⊤X ≤ ∆
∗
Xα if and only if δX ≤ α
iv) (C, P ) is higher order.
Triposes are elementary doctrines, where the elementary structure is provided
by the point iii of the definition.
An important characterization theorem of the theory of triposes is the following.
Proposition 1.1. A doctrine (C, P ) is a tripos if and only if
i) (C, P ) is a Π-doctrine
ii) for every A in C there is an operation→:P (A)×P (A) −→ P (A) such that
for every f :X −→ A and every α, β in P (A) it is f∗(α→ β) = f∗α→ f∗β
iii) for every projection πA:X ×A −→ A in C it is
ΠpiA(π
∗
Aα→ β) = α→ ΠpiAβ
for any α in P (A) and β in P (X ×A)
iv) for every γ, φ and ψ in P (A) it holds
a) φ ≤ ψ → φ
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b) γ → (φ→ ψ) ≤ (γ → φ)→ (γ → ψ)
c) if γ ≤ φ→ ψ and γ ≤ φ, then γ ≤ ψ
d) if φ ≤ ψ, then γ ≤ φ→ ψ
v) (C, P ) is higher order.
This is theorem 1.4 of [2], whose proof basically relies on the second order
encoding a` la Prawitz [9]. A similar proof is also in [3].
A doctrine which satisfies point ii), iii) and iv) of the previous definition is
said implicational.
An easy property which a primary implicational doctrine has is that if it is
a Σ(A)-doctrine, for some pullback stable class A of arrows of its base, then it
satisfies Frobenius reciprocity [3]. Therefore primary implicational Σ-doctrines
are automatically existential.
2 (co-)Comprehension and triposes
In this section we derive many useful properties that doctrines have under the
assumption of having comprehension. Then we introduce the notion of co-
comprehension, the dual notion of comprehension, and we study its connection
with the operation of negation that a doctrine may have. A special focus will
be given to triposes.
Recall that in a doctrine (C, P ) with comprehension, the collection CP is the
class of arrows of C of the form ⌊α⌋: {α} −→ A. We already remarked that CP
is closed under pullbacks.
Proposition 2.1. If (C, P ) is a primary doctrine with full comprehension, if for
every arrow ⌊α⌋ of CP , the functor ⌊α⌋
∗ has a left adjoint satisfying Frobenius
reciprocity, then (C, P ) is a restricted Σ(CP )-doctrine.
Proof. Note that for every A in C and every α in P (A) it is
∃⌊α⌋⊤{α} = α
In fact ⌊α⌋ trivially factors through ⌊∃⌊α⌋⊤{α}⌋ and by fullness of comprehen-
sion we get α ≤ ∃⌊α⌋⊤{α}. The other inequality is standard.
Given the pullback
{f∗α}
⌊f∗α⌋

q
// {α}
⌊α⌋

X
f
// A
7
by Frobenius Reciprocity we have
f∗Σ⌊α⌋⌊α⌋
∗ξ = f∗(ξ ∧ Σ⌊α⌋⊤{α})
= f∗ξ ∧ f∗α
= f∗ξ ∧ Σ⌊f∗α⌋⊤{f∗α}
= Σ⌊f∗α⌋⌊f
∗α⌋f∗ξ
= Σ⌊f∗α⌋q
∗⌊α⌋∗ξ
hence the claim.
An immediate corollary of the previous proposition is that every tripos (C, P )
with full-comprehension is a restricted Σ(CP )-doctrine. In fact triposes are im-
plicational existential doctrines, then they left left adjoints satisfy Frobenius
reciprocity.
The following lemma relates full comprehension with the implicational struc-
ture of a doctrine.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose (C, P ) is a Π-doctrine with full comprehension, if (C, P )
is a restricted Π(CP )-doctrine then it is implicational.
Proof. For every A in C and every φ, ψ in P (A) define
φ→ ψ = Π⌊φ⌋⌊φ⌋
∗ψ
We need to verify points ii), iii) and iv) of definition 1.1.
ii) Suppose that f :X −→ Y is an arrow in C. By the restricted Beck-Chevalley
condition on the class CP we have
f∗Π⌊φ⌋⌊φ⌋
∗ψ = Π⌊f∗φ⌋⌊f
∗φ⌋∗f∗ψ
which proves that f∗(α→ β) = f∗α→ f∗β.
iii) Suppose that πA:X × A −→ A is a projection in C. Suppose α is in P (A)
and β in P (X ×A). Consider the pullback
{π∗Aα}
pA
//
⌊pi∗
A
α⌋

{α}
⌊α⌋

X ×A
piA
// A
Since (C, P ) is a Π-doctrine the Beck-Chevalley condition holds for πA and pA
(which is a projection, since the square is a pullback). Then it is
ΠpiA(π
∗
Aα→ β) = ΠpiAΠ⌊pi∗Aα⌋⌊π
∗
Aα⌋
∗β
= Π⌊α⌋ΠpA⌊π
∗
Aα⌋
∗β
= Π⌊α⌋⌊α⌋
∗ΠpiAβ
= α→ ΠpiAβ
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iv) Suppose φ, ψ, γ are in P (A).
iv-a) This is an immediate consequence of the fact that Π⌊ψ⌋ is a right ad-
joint.
iv-b) Note that
(γ → φ)→ (γ → ψ) = Π⌊γ→φ⌋⌊γ → φ⌋
∗(γ → ψ)
= Π⌊γ→φ⌋(⌊γ → φ⌋
∗γ → ⌊γ → φ⌋∗ψ)
= γ → Π⌊γ→φ⌋⌊γ → φ⌋
∗ψ
= γ → ((γ → φ)→ ψ)
The arrow ⌊⊤A⌋ is the identity on A, hence ⊤A → φ = Π⌊⊤A⌋⌊⊤A⌋
∗φ = φ.
Recalling that ⌊γ⌋∗γ = ⊤A, we get the following associativity law
⌊γ⌋∗(γ → (φ→ ψ)) = ⌊γ⌋∗(φ→ ψ) = ⌊γ⌋∗((γ → φ)→ ψ)
whence
γ → (φ→ ψ) ≤ Π⌊γ⌋⌊γ⌋
∗((γ → φ)→ ψ)
= γ → ((γ → φ)→ ψ)
iv-c) Assume γ ≤ φ→ ψ and γ ≤ φ. Since ⌊γ⌋∗γ = ⊤A, we have ⌊γ⌋
∗φ ≤ ⌊γ⌋∗ψ
and hence ⊤A ≤ ⌊γ⌋
∗ψ. By fullness of comprehension γ ≤ ψ.
iv-d) Suppose φ ≤ ψ. It is γ ≤ Π⌊φ⌋⌊φ⌋
∗ψ if and only if ⌊φ⌋∗γ ≤ ⌊φ⌋∗ψ.
Since ⌊φ⌋∗φ = ⊤A, the assumption that φ ≤ ψ implies ⌊φ⌋
∗ψ = ⊤A, from which
the claim.
Remark 2.3. We did not find any reference for lemma 2.2. Even if the author
is aware that similar statements are known in the case in which the doctrine
(C, P ) is primary. In this respect the following statement is more general as it
does not require a meet operation on posets. If the doctrine (C, P ) is primary the
statement is proved by showing that → is a Heyting implication, i.e. α∧φ ≤ ψ
if and only if α ≤ φ→ ψ. This proof can be found in [4].
Fullness of comprehension might appear to play a little role in the proof, but
in a Π-doctrine with comprehension the assignment
(α, β) 7→ Π⌊α⌋⌊α⌋
∗β
provides the implicational structure if and only if comprehension is full. One di-
rection is in the previous theorem. For the converse we have that ⌊α⌋∗α ≤ ⌊α⌋∗β
if and only if α ≤ α→ β. Then α ≤ β by iv-c.
Co-comprehension is the dual notion of comprehension. We say that a doc-
trine (C, P ) has co-comprehension if for every A in C the poset P (A) has a
bottom element ⊥A and for every α in P (A) there is an arrow
⌈α⌉: {α}o −→ A
with ⌈α⌉∗α ≃ ⊥X such that for every f :Y −→ A with f
∗α ≃ ⊥Y there is a
unique arrow k:Y −→ with ⌈α⌉k = f .
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Arrows of the form ⌈α⌉ are monic. Thus if (C, P ) has co-comprehension, there
is a faithful contravariant functor from P (A) to subC(A) which is given by the
assignment α 7→ ⌈α⌉. We say that (C, P ) has full co-comprehension if the previ-
ous assignment is also full. If this is the case, it is not hard to prove that α ≤ β
if and only if ⌈β⌉∗α = ⊥{α}o .
Let (C, P ) be a doctrine with co-comprehension. Suppose α is in P (A) and
consider any arrow f :X −→ A. The following is a pullback
{f∗α}o
q
//
⌈f∗α⌉

{α}o
⌈α⌉

X
f
// A
where q is the arrow induced by the universal property of ⌈α⌉. Hence the class
CoP of arrows of C of the form ⌈α⌉ is closed under pullbacks.
The notion of co-comprehension is related to the notion of comprehension in
the case in which the doctrine as a operation of negation.
Recall that a primary doctrine has negation if for every A in C the poset
P (A) has a bottom element and there is an operation ¬:P (A) −→ P (A) such
that for every α, β in P (A), it is
α ≤ ¬β if and only if α ∧ β = ⊥A
If it holds also that α = ¬¬α the doctrine is said classical
Proposition 2.4. Suppose (C, P ) is a doctrine with comprehension and nega-
tion. The following hold.
i) (C, P ) has co-comprehension.
ii) if (C, P ) is a restricted Σ(CP )-doctrine, it is also a restricted Σ(C
o
P )-
doctrine
iii) if (C, P ) has full comprehension, then (C, P ) has full co-comprehension if
and only if (C, P ) is classical.
Proof. i) Suppose α is in P (A). Define
⌈α⌉: {α}o −→ A = ⌊¬α⌋: {¬α} −→ A
It is ⊤A = ⌊¬α⌋
∗(¬α) then ⊥A = ¬⊤A = ¬⌊¬α⌋
∗(¬α) = ⌊¬α⌋∗(¬¬α). Since
α ≤ ¬¬α we have ⊥A = ⌊¬α⌋
∗α.
If f :Y −→ A is such that f∗α = ⊥Y , then ⊤Y = ¬f
∗α = f∗(¬α). By the
universal property of comprehension, there is a unique k:Y −→ {α}o with
f = ⌊¬α⌋k = ⌈α⌉k.
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ii) Since arrows in CoP are of the form ⌊¬α⌋, C
o
P constitutes a pullback sta-
ble subclass of CP . Then the restricted Beck-Chevally condition with respect
to CoP is inherited from the restricted Beck-Chevalley condition with respect to
CP .
iii) Suppose (C, P ) has full comprehension. If ⌊¬α⌋∗β ≤ ⌊¬α⌋∗α it is also
⌊¬α⌋∗¬α ≤ ⌊¬α⌋∗¬β. By fullness of comprehension we have ¬α ≤ ¬β. Then
β ≤ α if and only if (C, P ) is classical.
We proved that in a doctrine with full-comprehension, a classical negation
implies the existence of full co-comprehension. If we think at co-comprehension
as a way to deal with abstract complementation, we may guess that the presence
of both full comprehension and full co-comprehension implies the existence of
a classical negation. The answer is negative. Consider the doctrine (Top,op),
where Top is the category of topological spaces and continuous functions and
op is the functor which maps every topological space into the collection of its
open sets and every continuous function to the inverse image functor. For every
space X and every open set U of X the inclusions
U →֒ X and U c →֒ X
where U and its complement U c are endowed with the subspace topology,
provide the full comprehension and the full co-comprehension structure for
(Top,op), which has not the operation of negation [5].
3 The axiom of choice in doctrines
In this section we introduce the axiom choice in the context of doctrines. The
idea is to mimic what happen in the doctrine (Sets,P) where the base is the
category of sets and functions and P is the contravariant powersets functor. The
axiom of choice can be phrased in the following way: for every binary relation
ψ in P(Γ×A), where the set A is not empty, there is function ǫψ: Γ −→ A such
that for all element x in Γ
∃a ∈ A (x, a) ∈ φ↔ (x, ǫφ(x)) ∈ φ
Clearly the fact that A is not empty is not empty is a necessary condition for
the existence of the function ǫψ. Then, to deal with the axiom of choice, in the
way we have formulated it, we need a notion of emptiness, at the general level
of doctrines. The generalization of the empty set in the context of a generic
doctrine is provided by the notion of stable initial object [8], i.e an object 0 of
C which is initial and such that X × 0 ≃ 0 for any X .
Definition 3.1. A doctrine (C, P ) satisfies the axiom of choice (AC) if for every
object A in C which is not a stable initial object, for every object Γ in C the
functor π∗Γ has a left adjoint ΣpiΓ and for every ψ in P (Γ × A) there exists an
arrow ǫψ: Γ −→ A such that
ΣpiΓψ = 〈idΓ, ǫψ〉
∗ψ
We now prove that, under some mild conditions, every doctrine validating
the axiom of choice (AC) is a Σ-doctrine.
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Lemma 3.2. If a (C, P ) validatesAC, if C has a stable initial object and if posets
P (A) are not empty, then all arrows of the form k:X −→ 0 are isomorphisms.
Proof. If k is not iso, X is not a stable initial object, and since P (1×X) contains
an element x, by AC we have an arrow ǫx: 1 −→ X . Then kǫx: 1 −→ 0 makes C
degenerate. A contradiction.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose (C, P ) is a doctrine satisfying AC. For every projection
πΓ: Γ×A −→ Γ where A is not a stable initial object, for every ψ ∈ P (Γ× A)
and every h: Γ −→ A, it is
〈idΓ, h〉
∗ψ ≤ 〈idΓ, ǫψ〉
∗ψ
Proof. Apply 〈idΓ, h〉
∗ to both sides of ψ ≤ π∗ΓΣpiΓψ = π
∗
Γ〈idΓ, ǫψ〉
∗ψ.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose (C, P ) is a doctrine satisfying AC, such that for
every A in C the poset P (A) has a bottom element. Suppose also that if 0 is a
stable initial object, then P (0) is a singleton. (C, P ) is a Σ-doctrine.
Proof. We need to prove that for every projection πΓ: Γ× A −→ Γ the left ad-
joint ΣpiΓ satisfying the Beck-Chevalley condition.
Suppose A is not a stable initial object. By AC it is
ΣpiΓψ = 〈idΓ, ǫψ〉
∗ψ
Consider an arrow f : ∆ −→ Γ and the composition ǫψf : ∆ −→ A. By 3.3 it is
〈id∆, ǫψf〉
∗(f × idA)
∗ψ ≤ 〈id∆, ǫP (f×idA)(ψ)〉
∗(f × idA)
∗ψ
since
(f × idA)〈id∆, ǫψf〉 = 〈f, ǫψf〉 = 〈idΓ, ǫψ〉f
the previous inequality can be rewritten as
f∗ΣpiΓψ ≤ Σpi∆(f × idA)
∗ψ
which proves the claim, as the other inequality is standard.
Suppose A ≃ 0 is a stable initial object. Since 0 is stable we can confuse
the projection πΓ with the unique arrow !Γ: 0 −→ Γ. Since P (0) is a singleton,
the assignment ⊥0 7→ ⊥Γ provides a left adjoint to !
∗
Γ.
By 3.2 every arrow with codomain 0 is iso. So the pullback of f : ∆ −→ Γ
along the projection 0 −→ Γ is necessarily of the form
0
id0

!∆
// ∆
f

0
!Γ
// Γ
Hence f∗Σ!Γ⊥0 = f
∗⊥Γ = ⊥∆ = Σ!∆⊥0 = id
∗
0Σ!∆⊥0.
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Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 have the following corollary.
Proposition 3.5. A primary doctrine which satisfies the hypothesis of propo-
sition 3.4 is existential.
Proof. Suppose (C, P ) is such a doctrine. After 3.3 and 3.4 it remains to prove
that (C, P ) satisfy Frobenius Reciprocity. Consider a projection πΓ: Γ×A −→ A
Suppose A is not a stable initial object and for φ in P (Γ × A) and β in P (A)
denote by ξ the formula φ ∧ π∗Γβ. We have
ΣpiΓ(φ ∧ π
∗
Γβ) = 〈idΓ, ǫξ〉
∗(φ ∧ π∗Γβ)
Moreover
〈idΓ, ǫφ〉
∗φ ∧ β = 〈idΓ, ǫφ〉
∗(φ ∧ π∗Γβ)
apply lemma 3.3 to get
ΣpiΓφ ∧ β = 〈idΓ, ǫφ〉
∗φ ∧ β ≤ 〈idΓ, ǫξ〉
∗(φ ∧ π∗Γβ) = ΣpiΓ(φ ∧ π
∗
Γβ)
from which the claim follows, as the other inequality is standard.
If A ≃ 0 the the claim is trivial since the image of the left adjoints is a bottom
element.
4 Heacos and triposes
In this section we introduce the notion of Heaco which is an acronym for Higher
order Elementary doctrine validating AC and with CO-comprehension. We
also require that all these structures well interact together in the sense speci-
fied below, in the formal definition of heaco. Most of the section is devoted to
prove that a heaco (C, P ) has enough structure to construct a tripos with base C.
Suppose (C, P ) is a doctrine. To every poset P (A), we can associate the poset
P (A)op where α ≤ β in P (A)op if and only if β ≤ α in P (A). The functor
P o: Cop −→ Pos
which maps every object A of C in P o(A) = P (A)op and every arrow f :A −→ B
of C in P o(f) = P (f) = f∗ gives rise to a doctrine (C, P o).
It is straightforward to verify that the assignment (C, P ) 7→ (C, P o) is nilpo-
tent, i.e. (C, (P o)o) = (C, P ). Moreover (C, P ) has (full) comprehension if and
only if (C, P o) has (full) co-comprehension.
Lemma 4.1. If (C, P ) is a higher order Σ-doctrine with full co-comprehension
which is also a restricted Σ(CoP )-doctrine, then (C, P
o) is a tripos with full com-
prehension.
Proof. Since (C, P ) is a Σ-doctrine, (C, P o) is clearly a Π-doctrine. For the same
reason (C, P o) is a restricted Π(CoP )-doctrine, since C
o
P coincides with CP o , the
class of full comprehension of (C, P o). The claim follows from 1.1 and 2.2.
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Recall that in an elementary doctrine (C, P ) for every arrow f :X −→ A of
C the formula
G(f) = (f × idA)
∗δX
is called graph of f .
Definition 4.2. An eaco is an elementary doctrine (C, P ) with full co-comprehension
satisfying AC, such that: for every f :X −→ A in C and every α in P (A) it holds
that
f∗〈ǫG(⌈α⌉), idA〉
∗G(⌈α⌉) = 〈ǫG(⌈f∗α⌉), idX〉
∗G(⌈f∗α⌉)
A heaco is an eaco which is higher order.
Suppose (C, P ) is an eaco. Suppose that C has a stable initial object 0.
Proposition 4.3. P (0) is a singleton.
Proof. Suppose ξ is in P (0) and consider its co-comprehension
⌈ξ⌉: {ξ}o −→ 0
By 3.2 ⌈ξ⌉ is iso. By fullness of co-comprehension ξ = ⊥0.
Proposition 4.4. Every eaco is a an existential doctrine.
Proof. This is a corollary of 3.5 and 4.3.
Since an eaco (C, P ) is also elementary we have that for every f :A −→ B
the functor f∗ has a left adjoint Σf . Recall that we denoted by C
o
P the class of
arrows of C of the form ⌈α⌉.
Proposition 4.5. Every eaco (C, P ) is a restricted Σ(CoP )-doctrine.
Proof. Suppose (C, P ) is an eaco. Suppose also that f :X −→ A is an arrow in
C and α is in P (A). Consider the diagram
{f∗α}o
q
//
⌈f∗α⌉

{α}o
⌈α⌉

X
f
// A
Since an eaco is existential and elementary, we have that the functors ⌈α⌉∗ has
a left adjoint Σ⌈α⌉. We want to prove the restricted Beck-Chevalley condition
f∗Σ⌈α⌉⌈α⌉
∗β = Σ⌈f∗α⌉q
∗⌈α⌉∗β
An eaco validates AC, then it is existential as it validates Frobenius reciprocity.
Moreovoer equality predicates are substitutive. Then we have that the left hand
side of the previous equality is
f∗Σ⌈α⌉⌈α⌉
∗β = f∗ΣpiA(⌈α⌉ × idA)
∗δA ∧ π
∗
{α}⌈α⌉
∗β
= f∗ΣpiA(⌈α⌉ × idA)
∗δA ∧ π
∗
Aβ
= f∗β ∧ f∗ΣpiA(⌈α⌉ × idA)
∗δA
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For analogous reasons, the right hand side is
Σ⌈f∗α⌉q
∗⌈α⌉∗β = Σ⌈f∗α⌉⌈f
∗α⌉∗f∗β
= f∗β ∧ Σ⌈f∗α⌉⊤s
= f∗β ∧ ΣpiX (⌈f
∗α⌉ × idX)
∗δX
Finally
f∗ΣpiA(⌈α⌉ × idA)
∗δA = f
∗ΣpiAG(⌈α⌉)
= f∗〈ǫG(⌈α⌉), idA〉
∗G(⌈α⌉)
= 〈ǫG(⌈f∗α⌉), idX〉
∗G(⌈f∗α⌉)
= ΣpiXG(⌈f
∗α⌉)
= ΣpiX (⌈f
∗α⌉ × idX)
∗δX
from which the claim.
The immediate application of 4.1 and 4.5 is that every heaco (C, P ) gives
rise to a tripos (C, P o), this allows us to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 4.6. Every heaco is a Π-doctrine.
Proof. Suppose (C, P ) is a heaco. By 4.1 and 4.5 (C, P o) is a tripos and therefore
a Σ-doctrine. Then (C, (P o)o) = (C, P ) is a Π-doctrine.
Using the same argument we can infer that in every heaco, posets of the
form P (A) have finite joins (since P (A)o is a Heyting algebra).
Proposition 4.7. Suppose (C, P ) is an heaco, the following are equivalent
i) (C, P ) is implicational
ii) (C, P ) is a tripos
Proof. ii)⇒i) is immediate. The converse is also immediate after 4.6 and 1.1.
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